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Validity of a Treaty with a De-recognized
Entity-Taiwan: An Issue That Remains
Unsettled After New York Chinese TV
Programs v. U.E. Enterprises
BAOCHUN ZENG*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 24, 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided in New York Chinese TV Programs v. UE.
Enterprises, that works authored by Taiwanese citizens merit copy-
right protection under the United States-Taiwan Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation.2 The court further decided that
enforcement of the FCN Treaty is not barred by the lack of diplo-
matic relations between the United States and Taiwan. This decision
was based on the Taiwan Relations Act ("TRA"), 3 which mandates
that:
the continuation [of] ... all treaties and other international agree-
ments, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the
United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized
by the United States as the Republic of China (ROC) prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978,
unless and until terminated in accordance with law.
4
The court probably correctly decided enforceability of the FCN
Treaty under the TRA rules as domestic law of the United States.5
Thus, the Second Circuit's decision based on the TRA is not impeach-
* LL.M., International Law, Zhangshan University, Cantar, People's Republic of
China, 1990; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 1993. Ms. Zeng is a former Assistant
Professor of Law at Zhangshan University.
1. New York Chinese TV Programs v. U.E. Enterprises, 954 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4,1946, U.S.-China (R.O.C.),
63 Stat. 1299 [hereinafter FCN Treaty].
3. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3316 (1979)) [hereinafter TRA].
4. Id. (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3303(c)). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1979).
5. Although it is questionable whether Congress possesses the constitutional authority
to cause the FCN Treaty to remain in force as an international obligation, Congress' apparent
intent was to at least create consistent domestic rules.
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able. One issue, however, remains unsettled: whether the FCN Treaty
between the United States and the ROC is still valid under interna-
tional law, given that (1) the United States de-recognized the ROC in
1979 pursuant to recognition of the government of the People's Re-
public of China ("PRC") as the legal government of China, and (2)
acceptance that Taiwan is a part of China. 6 If the answer is affirma-
tive, we need to ask whether the TRA, and a United States court's
enforcement of the TRA, violate the international rights of the PRC.
II. FACTS
The FCN Treaty was signed on November 4, 1946, and became
effective on November 30, 1948.7 By signing the FCN Treaty, the
United States recognized the Guomindang Government as the gov-
ernment of China. The government of the PRC regarded the FCN
Treaty as void under the theory of inequality8 because, at the time of
its negotiation, "China's economic strength hardly matched that of
the post-war United States .... Nationalist China lacked the capabili-
ties to conduct even a fraction of the business in the United States
compared to the United States' business conducted in China."9
On February 27, 1972, the PRC and the United States released
the Shanghai CommuniqueO regarding the normalization of relations
between the two states. The normalization process, however, was in-
hibited by the United States' insistence that the Guomindang govern-
ment of Taiwan was the legitimate government of China.1' On
6. Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, Jan. 1, 1979, U.S.-
P.R.C., 79 DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1979, at 25, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 274 (1979) [hereinafter
1979 Comm.].
7. FCN Treaty, supra note 2.
8. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention recognizes a similar concept of coercion as a
ground to invalidate a treaty. The doctrine of inequality probably covers a wider scope be-
cause it takes into consideration the comparative economic power of the parties and, therefore,
gives rise to much argument as to its validity. However, the FCN Treaty may be terminated
under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus when there has been a fundamental change of circum-
stances. The fundamental change in the social system in China might render it impossible to
enforce the Treaty in the whole of China.
9. Jay Goldstein, Comment, Chinese & Western Treaty Practice: An Application to the
Joint Declaration Between the People's Republic of China and Great Britain Concerning the
Question of Hong Kong, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 167, 179 n.76 (1986) (citing HUNGDAH
CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 72 (1972)).
10. Joint Communique, Feb. 28, 1972, U.S.-P.R.C., 66 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1972, at 435,
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 443.
11. John E. Wolfinger, Comment, United States-China Relations: Has President Reagan's
Communique Revised International Obligations Towards Taiwan, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 326,
326 n.5, 328 n.21 (1984).
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December 15, 1978, the two governments jointly issued the Carter-
Hua Communique 2 in which the United States recognized the PRC
as the legal government of China. At the same time, the United
States government de-recognized the ROC and terminated the Mu-
tual Defense Treaty of 1954. It is noteworthy that the validity of
other existing treaties between the United States and the ROC, in-
cluding the FCN Treaty, were not questioned at that time by any
party, especially by the government of the PRC. This position re-
mains unchanged today, although the PRC government claims that it
is not obligated to honor previous treaties signed by the ROC.'3
In response to the action of the executive branch, Congress en-
acted the TRA, which mandates the continuation of all treaties and
other international agreements between the United States and Taiwan
in the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition of the ROC. On
August 17, 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued another joint com-
munique with the PRC 14 in which the United States reaffirmed that it
"acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China."' 5 Since then, the United States has estab-
lished the standard for Sino-United States relations: "[T]he American
people and people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and
other relations without official diplomatic relations."' 6 This was the
historical context in which the New York Chinese dispute arose.' 7
In 1982, the International Audio Visual Corporation ("IAVC"),
a California corporation, contracted with Taiwanese television sta-
tions for the right to sell video cassette copies of certain "soap operas"
("Programs") in the United States. Shortly after signing this agree-
ment, IAVC registered the Programs for copyright protection with
the United States Copyright Office.18
In April 1988, IAVC granted by agreement the exclusive license
to New York Chinese to distribute video cassette copies of the Pro-
grams in New York and New Jersey. The agreement also assigned to
New York Chinese the right to sue to protect IAVC's copyright in the
12. 1979 Comm., supra note 6.
13. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 177.
14. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Currency Policy No. 413, U.S.-China
Joint Comm. (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Comm.].
15. Id.
16. Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act: Issues and Concerns: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 133, 134 (1978) (statement of President Jimmy Carter to the Nation, Dec. 15, 1977).
17. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d 847.
18. Id. at 848.
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Programs within New York and New Jersey.' 9
The present controversy arose out of defendants' attempts to sell
the same Programs in the New York-New Jersey areas. Defendants
videotaped the Programs when they were broadcasting in Taiwan and
later surreptitiously shipped them into the United States for distribu-
tion to store-front video retail stores operated by defendants in the
New York metropolitan area.20
New York Chinese eventually discovered that defendants' stores
were renting out unauthorized videotapes of the Programs. It then
filed suit against defendants because none of the stores obtained valid
sub-licenses from New York Chinese for distribution.2
1
The district court concluded that defendants infringed the copy-
right in the Programs, and permanently enjoined defendants from
copying, distributing, selling, renting or otherwise marketing any cop-
ies of the Programs. Plaintiff also obtained a judgment for statutory
damages of $762,500.22
The parties later stipulated to reduce the damages, but defend-
ants appealed the decision that they were liable for copyright infringe-
ment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found such copyright
infringement in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1). That statute
confers protection on a national of any foreign nation that is a party
to a copyright treaty to which the United States is also a party.23
Therefore, the application of domestic law is based on the assumption
that New York Chinese is a national of a contracting party. The ap-
plicable treaty, as understood by the court, is the FCN Treaty be-
tween the United States and ROC. The FCN Treaty guarantees
the [reciprocal] privileges in regard to copyrights, patents, trade-
marks, trade names, and other literary, artistic and industrial prop-
erty, upon compliance with the applicable laws and regulations, if
any, respecting registration and other formalities which are or may
hereafter be enforced by the duly constituted authorities. 24
The court based the enforcement of the FCN Treaty on the
TRA, which requires the continuation in force of all treaties and
other international agreements between the United States and Tai-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 849.
22. Id. at 849.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1) (1988).
24. FCN Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, at 1309.
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wan.25 The major issue was whether a treaty with a territory which is
now part of a de-recognized state is valid under international law. 26
This must be considered in light of the fact that the revolutionary
government of the PRC has renounced the treaty because of the cir-
cumstances of its inception. At the same time, the "de-recognized"
government has always abided by it.
III. THE PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE COURT
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached its decision based
on principles of domestic law. Nevertheless, the TRA is of questiona-
ble validity under international law. It was a curious oversight for the
court not to question the validity of a treaty in light of international
law before recognizing it as the supreme law of the land.
The court's approach finds its justification in pragmatic consider-
ations. As the court points out in its decision, "we are mindful of the
strong commercial ties between the United States and Taiwan. In-
deed, Taiwan's trade with the United States has increased nearly four-
fold since 1979."27 In other words, the close commercial relationship
between United States and Taiwan may influence the legal standard
that determines entitlement to protection in United States courts
under a treaty of which the validity is doubtful. This utilitarian ap-
proach is even more obvious when the court actually endorsed self-
protectionism:
Taiwan, moreover, has unfailingly relied upon the FCN Treaty to
provide protection of its own copyright laws to works authored by
American citizens. Taiwan would have little reason to honor the
FCN Treaty if the United States were to turn its back on the
Treaty. Thus, our holding encourages the United States to provide
copyright protection to works authored by Taiwanese citizens, and
insures that Americans will receive copyright protection of their
works in Taiwan. 28
In light of this public interest, the court held that the FCN
Treaty was still in effect "by virtue of both Congress' enactment of the
TRA and the Executive Branch's position that the FCN Treaty has
remained in effect, and that the actions of both of these branches do
25. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 852.
26. Id. at 853.
27. Id. The court indicated that Taiwan imported over $11 billion of United States goods
in 1990 and exported over $22 billion of its own goods to the United States. Id. n.6.
28. Id. at 853-54.
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not violate the Constitution. ' 29 Therefore, the FCN Treaty was
found to be a valid "treaty" for the purpose of section 104(b)(1) of the
Copyright Act. 30
Given the fact that treaties are expressly declared to be "supreme
law of the land" 3' in the United States Constitution, it is curious that
the court nowhere in its ten page opinion probed the validity of this
treaty under international law. The term "treaty" in the Constitution
means an agreement between the United States and a foreign state or
other internationally recognized entity.32
IV. VALIDITY OF THE TRA AND THE FCN TREATY AS
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
The first issue in this case was whether the TRA and the FCN
Treaty are so integrated as to constitute a part of United States do-
mestic law. If so, because these documents insure greater rather than
fewer rights to aliens, international law is not concerned with this re-
sult; to the extent that these documents satisfy constitutional require-
ments, the TRA-FCN Treaty marriage is valid.
A. Separation of Powers with Respect to the FCN Treaty
Treaty obligations under international law, if any, may not be
avoided by domestic law. However, a treaty will not be given effect as
a rule for decision in a domestic court if the United States Constitu-
tion mandates that result. On the other hand, an agreement of ques-
tionable validity under international law may be given statutory effect
domestically. The TRA is the basis for any domestic legal effect of
the treaties with Taiwan. If the TRA is valid, the treaties with Tai-
wan may have legal effect in the United States regardless of their va-
lidity under international law.
Under the United States Constitution, a treaty made under the
authority of the United States "shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby .... 33 A treaty
"stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the
29. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 854.
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
32. International organizations, for example, can be parties to treaties. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 223 (1987) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT].
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, el. 2.
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Constitution and laws of the United States."' 34 Therefore, if the FCN
Treaty satisfies the constitutional requirement, it is enforceable by the
courts as a supreme law of the land, and is a basis for protection of the
plaintiff in this case.
The Constitution specifies that the President "shall have power,
by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... ,,35 In addi-
tion, "the President, as the 'sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations,' retains the exclusive power to ne-
gotiate international treaties .... ",36 However, "the content of that
power is uncertain due to cognate powers vested in Congress: for ex-
ample, regulation of foreign commerce, declaration of war and sup-
port of armies."'37
It is within the executive power to conclude the FCN Treaty
with the approval of the Senate, as a function of the foreign relations
power.38 This constitutional requirement was satisfied in 1948, when
it was ratified by the Senate.39
In 1949, when the ROC government left mainland China, the
force of the FCN Treaty was in question because the territory gov-
erned by the Treaty in fact changed. The Treaty's parties made no
amendment to reflect this material change. Arguably, the United
States obtained a different agreement with this material change of cir-
cumstance. A new deal would require the amendment to be approved
by the Senate as a new treaty. Since there was no amendment, the
FCN Treaty arguably terminated at the time when the applicable
treaty territory changed from the whole of China to Taiwan. Under
international law, the United States is not required to, but may, abide
by this treaty; the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus4° excuses any
obligation.
34. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
36. David A. Gottenborg, Note, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The
Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.), 9
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 239, 259 (1980) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
37. Cynthia J. Hill, Note, Unilateral Presidential Treaty Termination Power by Default:
An Analysis of Goldwater v. Carter, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 317, 361 (1980).
38. A counter argument that the Treaty relating to the regulation of foreign commerce is
within the exclusive power of Congress is not persuasive because the manifest intention of the
founders mandates that the treaty power be shared between the President and the Senate.
39. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 274 (1991) [hereinafter TREATIES IN
FORCE].
40. See supra note 6.
1993]
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Another argument against the FCN Treaty is based on govern-
ment-recognition rules of international law. The PRC government re-
nounced this particular treaty signed by the ROC. Under
international law, United States' recognition of the PRC in 1978 auto-
matically operates retroactively to 1949 when the PRC government
came into being.41 That is to say, the United States accepted the
PRC's 1949 renunciation by the 1978 Recognition Communique.
Thereafter, the FCN Treaty lost its validity and has never regained it.
Congress, therefore, was operating in a vacuum when it enacted the
TRA, which sought to prolong the life of the FCN Treaty.
However, a counter-argument would be that the PRC, by its ac-
quiescence, 42 revived this particular treaty between Taiwan and the
United States. If so, it is valid under United States law, like any other
treaty.
B. Congress' Power in the Enactment of the TRA
In addition to the difficult problem presented by the change of
treaty territories without Senate approval, there is the question of
whether the TRA is a domestic legal document complete in itself or
an attempted implementation of the FCN Treaty. The defendants in
New York Chinese claimed that the TRA, by substituting Taiwan for
the ROC, unconstitutionally amended the FCN Treaty.
43
The TRA arose from congressional efforts to limit the President's
power in foreign affairs. It was a response to the 1979 Recognition
Communique which called the validity of the United States-ROC
treaties into question, and purports to revive the treaties between the
United States and Taiwan. It thus presents problems of separation of
powers between the executive and the legislative branches.
If the TRA is an attempted amendment of the FCN Treaty or a
new treaty with Taiwan, it must have been negotiated by the Presi-
dent, and is subject to the two-thirds concurring vote from the Senate.
If it is simply a statute, as it is related to foreign commerce, its regula-
tion is within the powers of the Congress. The issue then is whether
the TRA is simply a federal statute that refers for its content to the
41. Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Ltd. (No. 2), [1939] 3 ALL E.R. 384 (C.A.
1938). See J. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 909 (3d ed. 1988).
42. See infra Part V.
43. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 853.
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FCN Treaty. If so, whether or not the treaty is valid, the legal status
of the TRA is not affected.
One possible argument is that, although the TRA takes the form
of a statute, it is a new treaty or an amendment of the FCN Treaty. It
changes the name of "ROC" to "Taiwan," and mandates "the contin-
uation in force of all treaties and other international agreements...
entered into by the United States and the Republic of China prior to
January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978,
unless and until terminated in accordance with law." 44 Because there
was a meeting of minds between Taiwan and the United States, the
TRA takes the form of a treaty and is subject to the treaty eligibility
requirements of Taiwan and to United States' constitutional law.45
As a treaty, the TRA cannot pass the constitutional hurdle because it
has never been submitted to the Senate for approval.46
This argument was explicitly rejected by the court when it said
that "a change in the name of the party to a treaty is not an 'amend-
ment' to that treaty. ,47 In reaching this conclusion, the court invoked
Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States.48
The issue in Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler was whether the treaty be-
tween the United States and Denmark continued to apply to Iceland
after the latter's separation from Denmark as an independent state.49
The court held that an "amendment" to a treaty means the change of
the obligations of the parties to a treaty, not the mere change in names
of the parties. 50 Accordingly, merely changing the name of the same
treaty territory did not affect the applicability of the treaty to
Iceland. 51
What distinguishes New York Chinese from Arnbjornsdottir-Men-
dler is the fact that Iceland became independent with Denmark's con-
sent.52 It was a re-arrangement of the territory and its attached treaty
44. TRA, supra note 3, § 3303(c).
45. See infra Part V.
46. The joint resolution of both houses of the Congress that approved the Interim Strate-
gic Arms Limitation Agreement, plus the President's signature, are argued to be the equivalent
to the normal treaty procedure. However, the two houses have not passed the TRA and there
has been no independent resolution to create such effect. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. No. 205,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1984).
47. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 854.
48. 721 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Id.
50. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 854.
51. Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler, 721 F.2d at 682.
52. Id. at 681.
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obligations. Therefore, the treaty covers the same territory in that
case, whereas the treaty territory in New York Chinese is dramatically
reduced with regard to the FCN Treaty. In the present case, not only
does the name of the same treaty territory change but both the United
States and the PRC agreed that the FCN Treaty did not apply to
mainland China. This change of the relevant treaty territory from the
whole of China to a much smaller territory of Taiwan is clearly a
material change in the obligations of the parties. 53 Therefore, unless it
passes the constitutional hurdle of Senate consent under its treaty
powers, the TRA should fail as an unconstitutional attempt to change
the obligations in the FCN Treaty.
Another constitutional issue is whether Congress has constitu-
tional authority to deal with such a problem by statute. Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the executive branch is responsible
for certain aspects of foreign relations. Negotiation of treaty relations
between the United States and Taiwan are of that nature. The execu-
tive branch must initiate and negotiate any treaty, including treaty
amendments. 54 Congress has no constitutional role in treaty negotia-
tion except for the Senate's power to consent to ratification. There-
fore, if the TRA is an attempted treaty amendment, it has not
conformed to the constitutional process; the FCN Treaty may not le-
gitimately derive its power from the TRA.
The TRA, however, appears to be a congressional response to
changes in executive policies related to Sino-United States issues. It
can be argued that the TRA derives its content from the FCN Treaty,
that it is a legislative act to regulate international commerce, and that
it is thus valid under the Constitution.55 Legislation directly affecting
United States-Taiwan trade relations is a legitimate exercise of Con-
53. Although the relevant territory of all treaties concluded by the ROC has been con-
fined to Taiwan after the PRC government took over the mainland China in 1949, the parties
did not change the name of ROC as the treaty party until 1978. Treaties in Force does not
indicate the restriction on the geographic coverage until 1980. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra
note 39, at 274.
54. The United States Constitution expressly authorizes the President to make treaties.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. As the sole organ of the United States in its international relations,
the President himself has authority to represent the United States in negotiating or concluding
international agreements. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 311 cmt. b.
55. The court never touched the issues regarding the validity of the FCN Treaty; it
treated the TRA as a domestic statute which requires the court to enforce the FCN Treaty. It
may be that the court viewed the TRA not as a treaty amendment or a new treaty, but as a
statute the contents of which are defined by the FCN Treaty. The validity of the treaty under
the domestic law, on this argument, does not arise.
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gress' power to regulate foreign commerce. 56 However, if the TRA
was enacted to dictate the terms of relations between Taiwan and the
United States and to affect the interests of the PRC,57 it would not be
valid. Even assuming the TRA had been enacted substantially for
regulation of commerce and would therefore be valid under the com-
merce power, it does not rely on the FCN Treaty for statutory stan-
dards. It instead purports to revive the TRA itself. Therefore, the
TRA only has effect if it successfully recreated the treaty in a new
form. The copyright in the present case would be protected only if
both documents were constitutionally valid.
C. Constitutionality Requirement and Later-in-Time Rule
There are two additional domestic rules governing this area. One
is that a rule of international law or a provision of a United States
international agreement will not be given legal effect in the United
States if it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution. How-
ever, this should not be an issue in this case because of the decision in
Goldwater v. Carter.5 8 In Goldwater, the United States Supreme
Court held that the legitimacy of the three communiques was a polit-
ical question and, therefore, beyond the power of judicial review. 59 In
one sense, that holding was a judicial recognition of the treaty power
of the executive branch in the context of recognition of governments.
If that is the case, by enacting the TRA, Congress may have imper-
missibly interfered with the independent exercise of the executive
power in foreign relations. 60
The other applicable domestic rule is the later-in-time rule.
Under that rule, where a conflict between an international agreement
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57. The policy of the United States for the enactment of the TRA is laid out in § 3301(b):
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and secur-
ity of the West Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States ..
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people of Taiwan.
28 U.S.C. § 3301(b). It is difficult to justify these policy expressions as regulation of interna-
tional trade.
58. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
59. Id.
60. The United States Supreme Court has restrained itself from interfering with the obli-
gations of the executive branch. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). Because the executive branch is the sole organ responsible for international relations
under the Constitution, Congress should not be able to thwart that responsibility.
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and federal legislation exists, the one entered into force later super-
sedes the earlier.6' Accordingly, in case of conflict the 1982 Commu-
nique should supersede the 1979 TRA. The New York Chinese court
observed that there would be a real conflict between the 1982 Com-
munique and the TRA if the TRA did give de facto recognition to
Taiwan as a nation.62 Under the 1982 Communique, the United
States "acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China
and Taiwan is part of China. '63 If there is any possible validity of the
TRA, it is inconsistent on this point. The courts are bound to follow
the more recent expression of United States policy, namely, the com-
muniques. Further, if the TRA had been later in time, its attempts to
re-shape international relations with the PRC without recourse to the
treaty making powers of the United States would likely render it inva-
lid. If invalid on that ground, it would not, of course, displace the
1982 Communique. Moreover, under international law, neither
branch of the United States government should recognize Taiwan as a
nation contrary to that Communique which is an international agree-
ment. Doing so would constitute a breach of an international agree-
ment, making the United States liable in international law even
though the action is legitimate under domestic law.
V. VALIDITY OF THE FCN TREATY AND THE TRA UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Through the FCN Treaty and the TRA, the United States at-
tempted to assume - albeit unconstitutionally - the international
obligation to protect Taiwanese copyrights in the United States.
Therefore, whether or not the FCN Treaty and the TRA are valid
under United States domestic law, the plaintiff may have recourse
against the United States if these documents create an international
obligation.
Under the FCN Treaty,
[t]he nationals, corporations and associations of either High Con-
tracting Party shall be accorded within the territory of the other
High Contracting Party effective protection in the exclusive use of
inventions, trademarks and trade names, upon compliance with the
applicable laws and regulations, if any, respecting registration and
61. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). In both cases, the Court gave effect to a statute that
was contrary to an earlier conflicting treaty.
62. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 853.
63. 1982 Comm., supra note 14.
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other formalities which are or may hereafter be enforced by the
duly constituted authorities; unauthorized manufacture, use or sale
of such inventions, or imitation or falsification of such trademarks
and trade names, shall be prohibited, and effective remedy therefor
shall be provided by civil action. 4
If the FCN Treaty remained valid under international law, plaintiff's
copyright should be protected by the United States copyright law. If
the United States failed to provide protection equal to that enjoyed by
a United States citizen due to some obstacles in its domestic regime,
the United States would be liable for the injury incurred by the
plaintiff.
65
The FCN Treaty and the TRA are documents that purport to
create rights in persons like the plaintiff. In the FCN Treaty, the
United States government recognized and expressed its willingness to
develop a diplomatic relationship with the ROC government. For
this purpose,
[t]he Government of each High Contracting Party shall have the
right to send to the Government of the other High Contracting
Party duly accredited diplomatic representatives, who shall be re-
ceived and, upon the basis of reciprocity, shall enjoy in the territo-
ries of such other High Contracting Party the rights, privileges,
exemptions and immunities accorded under generally recognized
principles of international law.
66
The issue then is whether the FCN Treaty lapsed upon the United
States' subsequent refusal to recognize the ROC.
A. The Legal Consequence of Recognition and De-recognition
Under international law, recognition is a legal-political act pro-
jecting both legal and political consequences. The recognizing state
assumes an obligation to respect the other government's sovereignty
in the administration of its territory. De facto recognition of a rival
government within the territory of the other, while maintaining diplo-
matic relations with both governments, violates international law.67
64. FCN Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
65. Of course, if the right arises solely under international law (there being no statute
creating a cause of action against the United States in the United States courts), only another
state can pursue the claim on behalf of the plaintiff.
66. FCN Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, para. 2.
67. See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D.
Cal. 1952). The district court in that case refused to recognize both governments simultane-
ously. After the United States recognized the PRC in 1979, the PRC government consistently
demanded that the U.S. not give de facto recognition to Taiwan, and that the relation should
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The Taiwan issue is complicated. The general rule, however, is
the same. After recognition of the PRC, no official or branch of gov-
ernment may recognize Taiwan as a "nation" under any circum-
stances without causing a breach of the international legal obligation
assumed by the United States. In New York Chinese, the Second Cir-
cuit violated this rule by its de facto recognition of Taiwan as a na-
tion.68 The court based its rationale on the "constitutive theory," that
is, "[a]n entity's status as a nation ... does not depend on whether it
receives diplomatic recognition from other nations. ' 69 If it exhibits
the basic elements of a nation, which are (1) a defined territory, (2) a
permanent population, (3) a government and (4) the ability to engage
in relations with other nations, then any country can recognize it as a
de facto nation.
70
In its relations with the mainland, Taiwan has acceded to the
PRC's suggestion that it participate in various international bodies as
"China, Taiwan." The United States, by recognizing that "there is
but one China and Taiwan is part of China, ' 71 has restricted itself by
treaty obligation 72 to go no further.
The United States' de facto recognition practice developed from
its subtle relations with the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. As
distinguished from the present case, in those cases the United States
courts simply recognized internal effect of the law and decrees of the
Soviet Union within Soviet territory.7 3 The courts, however, have
be unofficial, Id. Compare this position to that of the court and lawyers in Bank of China,
who insisted on a defacto recognition of Taiwan. See also New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 853
("[T]he United States' de-recognition of Taiwan did not change Taiwan's status as a nation.");
David J. Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recogni-
tion of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 930, 945-51 (1978).
68. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 853.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 1982 Comm., supra note 14.
72. Yet the Executive Branch of the United States government, in Hearings on Separa-
tion of Powers Questions Raised by the Communique Before the Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, maintained the position that the 1982 Commu-
nique "is not an international agreement and thus imposes no obligations on either party under
international law." President Reagan's Communique: Hearings on the Separation of Powers
Questions Raised by the Communique Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., (hearings not in publication at this date) (statement of Davis R.
Robinson, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, Sept. 27, 1982), quoted in Wolfinger, supra note 11, at
332. The Communique, jointly issued by the United States and the PRC, of course engages
international obligations. Whether it is a "treaty" in the constitutional sense, requiring Senate
confirmation, is a separate problem. Denmark v. Norway, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53.
73. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259 (1923);
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
898 [Vol. 15:885
Treaty Validity
consistently declared that only a recognized government may be a
plaintiff in United States courts.74 It can thus be inferred that recog-
nition and de-recognition bear on the qualification of an entity to ap-
pear before United States courts. Furthermore, the Soviet regime,
through revolution, effectively took control and administered the
whole territory of the previous Russia, substituting for the previous
government. The ROC, on the other hand, is a replaced regime,
though it exercises effective control over a part of the territory. Inter-
national law has recognized the former as a form of governmental
succession. 75 It is an entirely different matter to give defacto recogni-
tion to part of the territory of a state which the United States has a
treaty obligation not to recognize.
There is a possible legal justification for a plaintiff's judgment in
New York Chinese.76 The validity of the FCN Treaty might be based
on the PRC's acquiescence in treating Taiwan as a local authority
authorized by the central government to participate in limited inter-
national relations. This approach is closer to reality. A historically
close relationship between the United States and Taiwan had devel-
oped to such a stage that the PRC government was willing to take it
into account in the normalization negotiations. 77 Since the existing
commercial and cultural relations between Taiwan and the United
States are beneficial to all and to the detriment of none, the PRC gov-
ernment did not wish to disturb them.78 On the contrary, it condi-
tioned the normalization of Sino-American relations only on the
termination of one treaty, which was aimed at Mainland China as an
enemy. 79 By acquiescence in the limited applicability of all but one
existing treaty 80 between Taiwan and the United States, the PRC
adopted a realistic approach.81
B. The Party Requirement in the Law of Treaties
The Restatement defines international agreement as "an agree-
74. Salimoff & Co., 186 N.E. 679; Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 139 N.E.
259.
75. SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 923.
76. New York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 847.
77. SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 923.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Mutual Defence Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, U.S.-R.O.C., 6 U.S.T. 433.
81. Most of these treaties refer specifically to Taiwan as the relevant treaty territory. The
TRA also replaces the name "Republic of China" in all treaties with the name "Taiwan." Yet
the legal validity of such replacement under international law is doubtful.
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ment between two or more states or international organizations that is
intended to be legally binding and is governed by international law."'8 2
The word "party" is defined as "a state or international organization
that has consented to be bound by the international agreement and for
which the agreement is in force."' 83
Taiwan is arguably not even a state after the United States re-
fused to recognize it. It does not have the requisite international per-
sonality to be party to an international agreement. Yet, as the
American Law Institute put it, the formulation of legal rules in a Re-
statement is "in no sense an official document of the United States, ' 84
and "in a number of particulars the formulations in this Restatement
are at variance with positions that have been taken by the United
States government. 85
Traditionally, states have been the basic personalities in interna-
tional relations. Nevertheless, there are numerous circumstances in
which non-state entities are capable of participating in international
relations, including entering into treaties. Examples can be found in
the previously existing Soviet Union, which conferred upon Ukraine
and Byelo-Russia the authority to become parties to the Charter of
the United Nations as separate entities. Similarly, the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization as a non-state entity has been invited by the
United Nations to join the mission observers and to participate in in-
ternational relations to a certain extent. According to the United
States Constitution, a state may enter into an "Agreement or Com-
pact . . . with a foreign power" with the consent of Congress.8 6 A
more recent example is the Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom
and PRC on the Question of Hong Kong, in which the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy
to "maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and con-
clude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant interna-
tional organizations." 87
Consequently, the party requirement in the law of treaties is no
longer as stringent as it once was. A political subdivision of a state
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, at § 301(1).
83. Id. § 301(2).
84. Id. at Foreword.
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
87. People's Republic of China-United Kingdom: Agreement on the Future of Hong
Kong, Joint Declaration, art. 3, para. 10, 23 I.L.M. 1377 (1984) [hereinafter Agreement on
the Future of Hong Kong].
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may enter into an agreement with another state, provided the nature
of the agreement is not repugnant to the sovereignty of the central
government and it is explicitly or implicitly authorized by that
government.
The next issue, then, is whether the Central Government of the
PRC has authorized its Taiwan subdivision to enter into the FCN
Treaty. The answer is far from clear.
Under traditional international law, a treaty does not lapse as a
consequence of the succession of governments in a party. However,
the diplomatic and treaty relations between one state and a subdivi-
sion of another that is de-recognized would normally be terminated
upon the de jure recognition of the competing government.
Since the FCN Treaty was concluded by the ROC government in
1946, before the PRC government took control of mainland China,
there could have been no pre-authorization of the Treaty. The result
of a revolution, the PRC was established as a new government differ-
ent in nature from the ROC government. Soon after its establish-
ment, the PRC declared the ROC's 1946 FCN Treaty void from its
inception. 88
Since this particular treaty has been renounced by the PRC
under treaty succession theory, it certainly lapsed as between the
United States and China. Furthermore, it should have lapsed 89 as to
all parts of China, including Taiwan. United States' de-recognition of
the ROC government would seem to reinforce that conclusion.
Though logical, this conclusion fails to take into account the prag-
matic approach that the United States government takes on the Tai-
wan issue and the "understanding" of this approach by the PRC
government. 90 In order not to disturb the trading relations between
Taiwan and the United States, the PRC government acquiesced in all
treaties remaining in force between the United States and Taiwan,
with one exception. This acquiescence, together with the explicit per-
mission in the 1979 Communique that the American people and the
people of Taiwan "maintain commercial, cultural and other relations
88. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 179.
89. That is contrary to the fact. The treaties entered into between the ROC and the
United States are only applicable to Taiwan, not to mainland China. Furthermore, interna-
tional law would not recognize such a conclusion absent consent of the PRC. TREATIES IN
FORCE, supra note 39, at 274.
90. This pragmatic approach is fully reflected by the court's decision in this case. New
York Chinese, 954 F.2d at 854.
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without official relations,"'91 constitutes the PRC's consent with
respect to the United States-Taiwan treaty practices. This consent
has created a special treaty rule governing United States-Taiwan
relations.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, the FCN Treaty may be
deemed valid because of the conduct of the PRC government. The
PRC government, upon the normalization of Sino-American rela-
tions, did not have any objection to the FCN treaty being restored as
between Taiwan and the United States. The PRC government may
consider the enforcement of the Treaty between Taiwan and the
United States to be beneficial to maintain cultural, commercial and
other unofficial relations. The issue of treaty succession is simply de-
ferred to the time of reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. In
other words, this acquiescence can be construed as the Central Gov-
ernment's delegation of limited treaty power to the Taiwanese author-
ties with respect to treaties applicable to the localities.
This interpretation of the PRC government's intent seems to be
supported by the PRC treaty practice evidenced by the Joint Declara-
tion on the Question of Hong Kong. The only distinction between the
two cases is that the authorization of treaty power from the Central
Government to Hong Kong is explicit in the Joint Declaration,
whereas the treaty power of Taiwan was accepted retrospectively.
This difference should not affect the validity of the treaties.
As communications and business relations between mainland
China and Taiwan develop, treaties concluded by Taiwan to which
the PRC is not a party may well be accepted by the Central Govern-
ment for implementation only in Taiwan, much as was true with
Hong Kong.92 If so, the question of whether Taiwan has treaty power
under international law will be moot.
C. Effect of the Three Joint Communiques
Pacta sunt servanda is an ancient rule of international law. The
issue is whether the three Joint Communiques constitute international
agreements. The United States executive, in hearings on separation of
powers questions raised by the communiques, testified before the Sub-
91. 1979 Comm., supra note 6.
92. The PRC government provided that "[i]nternational agreements to which the Peo-
ple's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain
implemented in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Agreement on the Future of
Hong Kong, supra note 87, at 1377.
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committee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee that the 1982 Communique "is not an international agreement and
thus imposes no obligations on either party under international
law.,,
93
This position is less than persuasive even to American lawyers.
94
Since the Permanent Court of International Justice found in the case
concerning the legal status of Eastern Greenland that the government
of Norway is bound by the commitment made by its Foreign Minis-
ter, "a statement by the President of the United States should have an
equal or greater status than one made by a foreign minister.1
95
The three Communiques certainly are international agreements
as defined in the Restatement, that is, "an agreement between two or
more states or international organizations that is intended to be le-
gally binding and is governed by international law."'96 In Weinberger
v. Rossi,97 the Court held that the Communiques, as executive agree-
ments, had status under United States law. Since the three joint com-
muniques between the United States and China were understood as
one of the prerequisites to the normalization of Sino-American rela-
tions, the United States government must have intended to be bound.
The fact that the United States complied validates this conclusion.
"A joint communique is a new form of international agreement.
It is partly unilateral declarations of the parties and partly a record of
the parties' consensus regarding their rights and obligations. '9 8 "Re-
gardless of the position of United States municipal law, under interna-
tional law, the joint communiques are international agreements,
binding on the parties. International obligations bind the state, not
particular branches, institutions, or members of its government." 99
No matter what kind of legal system a country adopts, it is a single
unit in the international legal system. The government cannot claim
domestic law, even its Constitution, as a justification for its violation
of international law.' 00 International liability follows as a conse-
quence of the breach.' 01 United States courts may refuse to give effect
93. Wolfinger, supra note 11, at 327 n.15.
94. Id. at 332-33.
95. Id.
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 301(1).
97. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
98. Chen Tiqiang, Some Legal Problems in Sino-US. Relations, 22 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 41, 56 (1983).
99. Id. at 45.
100. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 115(b).
101. Id.
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to an international agreement based on domestic law.102 Neverthe-
less, "[t]hat a rule of international law or a provision of an interna-
tional agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the
United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of
a violation of that obligation."10
3
Since the United States would otherwise be in violation of its in-
ternational legal obligations, the United States should precisely ob-
serve the three Communiques. The three branches of the United
States government should speak with a single voice, recognizing the
PRC as the sole legitimate government of the state of China. There
should be no de facto recognition of the ROC. The judicial branch
should not recognize it as such, as it appears to have in this case. Any
such conduct, even by the judiciary, is illegal action by the United
States under international law.
VI. PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
If a plaintiff can prove that international law protects the right
vested in it, it may directly invoke the treaty in the United States
courts. The next issue is whether the treaty provision enacts a pre-
existing rule of customary international law which might have
granted a plaintiff rights to United States copyright protection, or
whether the treaty is one of a self-executing nature. In case of a non-
self-executing treaty, the issue is whether the legislature has made it
law by statutory implementation. If the treaty is either self-executing
or is enforceable because of an implementing statute, a party may in-
voke the treaty in its interest.
It is generally agreed that, notwithstanding the long history of
business transactions across borders, there is no customary interna-
tional law governing the rights and duties of states to permit entry of
foreign goods. 0 4 International human rights law and international
economic law have not developed to such a stage that individuals'
economic rights are directly protected. Consequently, even though a
plaintiff may have a cause of action under the United States copyright
law in United States domestic courts, that right is not protectable
under customary international law.
A treaty between the state of the alien's nationality and the re-
ceiving state may grant this copyright protection. Under the FCN
102. Id. § 115(b) cmt. a.
103. Id.
104. SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 1132.
904 [Vol. 15:885
Treaty Validity
Treaty, the Taiwanese copyright in this case is valid, and the United
States has assumed the responsibility to protect it within its territory.
If the treaty is self-executing, it operates just like a statute, and the
owner automatically enjoys statutory protection equal to that enjoyed
by a United States person.
According to the Restatement, "[p]rovisions in treaties of friend-
ship, commerce, and navigation, or other agreements conferring
rights on foreign nationals, especially in matters ordinarily governed
by State law, have been given effect without any implementing legisla-
tion, their self-executing character assumed without discussion."' 10 5
In Asakura v. Seattle,1°6 the plaintiff successfully relied on a na-
tional treatment provision in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between the United States and Japan ("Japanese FCN
Treaty") for protection of his right to trade in the United States. The
Court found that the Japanese FCN Treaty "[operates] of itself with-
out the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied
and given authoritative effect by the courts."' 10 7
Although the Court did not use the term "self-executing," it is
clear that the Japanese FCN Treaty was of that nature in that case.
Similarly, the FCN Treaty in the present case is related to national
treatment on copyright, which is similar to Asakura. Therefore, this
provision should also be enforceable by the court "without the aid of
any legislation," and the plaintiffs would be protected by the United
States copyright law.
In some recent cases, courts have found that treaties are more
likely to be non-self-executing when they involve subjects that Con-
gress has regulated extensively. For example, in Robertson v. General
Electric Co.,108 a treaty regarding patents on industrial property was
held not self-executing because:
Congress alone was given by the Constitution the power to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries treaty provisions relating to patent
rights must be deemed dependent upon legislation in aid thereof. 109
It can be argued that the Congress has chosen to regulate copyrights
105. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 111 cmt. 5.
106. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
107. Id. at 341.
108. 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 571 (1929).
109. Id. at 500.
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in the way specified in the TRA and the FCN Treaty. Since the issue
involved in the present case is governed not only by the treaty, but
also by the TRA, separation of powers is not an issue here.
Other courts emphasize intent as the self-execution test. In Sei
Fuji v. California, 110 the plaintiff relied on Articles 55 and 56 of the
United Nations Charter for protection of his right to own land in the
United States as an alien. The court held that the Charter provisions
relied on by the plaintiff were not intended to supersede existing do-
mestic legislation and, therefore, were not self-executing. The court
did mention that no treaty between the United States and Japan con-
ferred upon the plaintiff the right to own land. A different result
could be argued if the right in Sei Fuji had been covered in a specific
provision of the FCN Treaty, as in Asakura.
In the present case, even if the plaintiff is not protected by cus-
tomary international law or by the treaty, it may be able to establish,
on common law estoppel theory, that its right is protected by the
United States copyright law. Under common law, if one party has
created a reasonable expectation on the part of another, in reliance
upon which the other changes position, this party is estopped from
denying the existence of that obligation.
The FCN Treaty, its continuance in force mandated by the TRA,
is actually listed in Treaties In Force,III which evidences it as an ac-
tive treaty between the United States and Taiwan.1 2 Even if the FCN
Treaty is invalid under international law and United States domestic
law, the Treaty may have created a reasonable reliance on the part of
the Taiwanese businesses that the Treaty will protect them. In reli-
ance on such treaty protection, the Taiwanese businesses may have
changed their position by not obtaining the otherwise available copy-
right protection as other foreign businesses did under United States
law. Under such circumstances, the United States arguably should be
estopped from changing the law and applying it retroactively, conse-
quently denying its treaty obligation to protect the Taiwanese copy-
right. If this is a sound argument, plaintiff may claim a private right
for copyright protection under the estoppel doctrine.
Although the common law estoppel doctrine is a domestic legal
concept, it may apply to the present case by virtue of Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which specifies one of
110. 217 P.2d 481 (D. Cal. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).




the sources of international law as "the general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations.""13 The plaintiff, however, has the bur-
den to prove that this is a well recognized principle in major legal
systems. However, since the dispute in the present case occurred be-
tween two private persons, the estoppel doctrine may not be applica-
ble as against defendants in this case. The common law estoppel
doctrine operates to estop a party who induces detrimental reliance of
another party from denying the implied promise. Here, it was the
United States government, not the defendants, who had created the
plaintiff's expectation. The defendants should not be estopped by the
act of the United States. The plaintiff may have a cause of action
against the United States, but this should not affect the rights of the
defendants.
This estoppel argument may put the court in a difficult position.
On the one hand, if it fails to protect plaintiff's right arising from
reasonable reliance on the FCN Treaty and the TRA, it may put the
United States in default of an international obligation. On the other
hand, since defendants did not create the plaintiff's expectation, they
should not be estopped by the act of the government.
However, a government is the representative of its people in in-
ternational relations. Thus, the obligations the United States govern-
ment assumes here are exchanged for Taiwanese protection of the
United States copyright. Therefore, the defendants who contract
through their "agent"-the United States government-should be
bound by the contract and the estoppel theory. Furthermore, if the
treaty and the TRA are valid under United States law, this argument
will be unnecessary because these two documents simply operate as
domestic law in a United States court.
If the conduct of the United States misled Taiwan into believing
that these rights would be protected, the estoppel could run in favor
of Taiwan, allowing enforcement of its rights. In fact, the customary
rule of international law, by general principle, protects these rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The court in the New York Chinese case ignored both the consti-
tutional and international legal requirements, deciding the case
merely on pragmatic considerations. This might be expedient, but is
unprincipled. The most harmful aspect of this decision to Sino-Amer-
113. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED
DOCUMENTS (1991).
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ican relations is the de facto recognition of Taiwan as a "nation."
This is not only contrary to the international obligations assumed by
the United States through the three communiques with the PRC but
is also inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine in that it
conflicts with the Continental domain of the executive in foreign rela-
tions. Furthermore, it violates the policy that the three branches
should speak with a unified voice in international relations.' 14
The same protection in the FCN Treaty may be available to the
Taiwanese, based on domestic law or the doctrine of estoppel. If the
United States, by its conduct, misled Taiwan into believing that these
rights would be protected, the estoppel theory would compel that
these rights be enforced.' 15 Since this concept is a United States do-
mestic law that confers greater rights on aliens, both the PRC and the
ROC should be happy with the result that Chinese copyright is pro-
tected. This resolution should also avoid international legal problems
or problems with Sino-American relations.
In light of this alternative way to protect the Taiwanese intellec-
tual property, the court's seemingly expedient solution through recog-
nition of Taiwan as a state may not be the best one.
The Taiwan issue has been a shadow upon Sino-American rela-
tions. As the economic and the political cooperation between Taiwan
and mainland China develops, this issue will be solved by the Chinese
among themselves some day. Thereafter, the United States courts will
be relieved of the conundrum.
114. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
115. There may also be a customary rule of international law by general principle under
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note
113.
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